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TlE CASE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE
CANVASSERS.
IN framing a constitution for the protection of free institutions
in this country the statesmen who were called to the task found it
necessary to devise an apportionment of the powers of sovereignty
between the state jurisdiction on the one hand and the federal jurisdiction on the other, and as the best practicable arrangement which
coul be agreed upon, they assigned to the latter certain powers
particularly specified, leaving the others to the states : United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358; Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C.
C. 313; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. Each jurisdiction is fully equipped with executive, legislative and judicial officers, and each is expected to
move within its assigned sphere without let or hindrance from the
other: .e~ulloch v. Maryfland, 4 Wheat. 316; Ablernan v.
Booth, supra. But just as an invasion of the jurisdiction of one
government by another when their division is by territorial lines
would be likely to lead to irritation, the disturbance of friendly
relations and at last to war, so here the invasion of jurisdiction
where the dividing line is different, has an inevitable tendency to
breed irritation and civil dissensions, and to disturb the bonds of
union, and continued encroachment must necessarily either work
a gradual revolution, or entirely break up the government. It
therefore becomes the solemn duty of every patriotic citizen when
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such an encroachment takes place to enter vigorous protest, and if
possible to make the protest so emphatic that it shall be heard and
felt. in order that, to the full extent of his powers, he may assist
in preventing the like encroachments in the future. And this
duty is especially incumbent on the legal profession where the encroachiment is ventured upon by judicial tribunals.
On the first Tuesday of November last an election took place in
the state of South Carolina for state officers, members of the legislature, representatives in Congress, electors of president and vicepresident, and county officers, and the resulc of the election was
duly reported by the county and district managers to the state
board of canvassers. By law this board consisted of I. E. Hayne,
secretary of state, F. L. Cardozo, state treasurer, T. C. Dunn,
controller-general, William Stone, attorney-general, and I. W.
Purvis, adjutant and inspector-general.
Three of these persons, Hayne, Cardozo and Dunn, constituting
a majority of the board, were candidates for re-election, and if
they sat as members of the board, were to decide between themselves
and their opponents. The board convened November 10th, for
the purpose of canvassing the returns, and adjourned to the next
day. Meantime an intense solicitude prevailed throughout the
state regarding the probable result. It was known that the election was close, and the prevailing belief seemed to be that on the
face of the returns the ticket opposed to that on which tIayne,
Cardozo and Dunn were candidates had a majority, and that if
the votes were declared as reported, that ticket, which we shall
call the Hampton ticket, would be declared elected. But it also
came to be generally known that the board of state canvassers
claimed judicial powers, and that they were likely to reject certain returns which gave conside~able majorities against their party,
and thereby elect candidates who on the face of the returns would
appear' to be defeated. The political complexion of the legislature
would be changed by this process if resorted to, and it thus appeared
that the whole political machinery of the state for the next two
years was likely to depend upon the proposed action. As a majority of the board of canvassers were directly interested in the
result, and might, if judicial powers were conceded to them, elect
themselves by the mere exercise of the will to do' so, it was not
unreasonable to suppose that upon the determination of the question whether their powers were judicial, or on the other hand ministerial only, would depend the final count. Acting in this belief,
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the candidates on the Hampton ticket appeared before the board
by counsel and filed protests against any other than ministerial
action, and against any member of the board whose case was to be
passed upon sitting as a member. On the legal issue 'raised by
these protests counsel were heard November 13th and the board
adopted the following resolutions:"1. Resolved, that the board of state canvassers do not propose
to canvass the returns of governor and lieutenant-governor, as it is
of opinion that the determination of the election of those officers is
given by the constitution to the General Assembly.
"2. Resolved, that the state board of canvassers have the right
to hear protests as to the election of electors for president and vicepresident, and members of Congress, and to give their certificate
to such persons as have the highest number of votes.
"3. Resolved, that it is the opinion of the board of state canvassers, that the secretary of state, state treasurer and comptrollergeneral, have the right to sit as members of this board, to hear and
determine all questions coming before them, except that neither of
the said officers shall vote upon his own election."
Thereupon, the Supreme Court of the state being in session, R.
M. Simms and his associates on the Hampton ticket presented to
the court a petition, reciting the facts already stated and reciting
further that the board of state canvassers were proceeding to hear
and determine all matters of contest or protest before them in regard to the election of persons who were candidates for the several
offices at the said election, and to certify their determination on"
such contests and protests to the secretary of state, and that the
secretary of state was about to issue certified copies of such determination to the parties in whose favor such determination should
be made; and praying that a writ of prohibition issue directed to
the said secretary of state and to the several members of the board,
prohibiting and forbidding the said board from exercising any judicial functions or duties whatever in regard to any protests or
contests which had been or might be submitted to them touching
said election, and from hearing and determining any such protests
or contests, and from doing anything further than the ministerial
acts of ascertaining from the managers' returns and the statements
forwarded by the boards of county canvassers for the respective
counties, the persons who had received the highest number of votes
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fir the offices for which they were candidates respectively, and declaring the samne, and certifying such statements to the secretary of
state; and restraining and prohibiting the said secretary of state
from receiviiig or recording any certified statement or determination of the board in any case in which the board heard or determined any contest or protest, and from issuing to any person any
copy of any certified statement or determination of the board in any
case in which the board has heard or determined any protest, and
from issuing any copy of any certified statement of the board to
any person who had not received, according to the managers' returns and the statements forwarded by the boards of county canvassers the greatest number of votes cast for the office for which
he was a candidate. The petition also prayed that the relators
might have such other and further relief, and such other and further original and remedial writs as might be necessary to the supervisory control by the court of the said board of state canvassers
in furtherance of justice and to the protection of the relators.
On presentation of this petition order was taken that the suggestions therein be heard and considered as separate suggestions ;
the one praying for the writ of prohibition only, and the other
praying for the writ of mandamus only. Also, a rule that the
members of the board and the secretary of state show cause on the
16th day of November instant, at 12.30 o'clock P. m., why a writ
of prohibition should not issue as prayed. The counsel for the
relators at the same time asked an ad interim restraining order as
a part of the rule to show cause, but this the court declined, stating
that the rule itself operated as a restraint, and that it was not to
be supposed that the board would proceed, and it would be a high
contempt of court to do so. On the same day the board of canvassers adopted a resolution, that "the board will not act upon
any proposition until the question of its powers and duties be
decided by the Supreme Court."
November 16th the relators filed their return in which they set
out in detail the grounds on which they relied in claiming judicial
powers. Upon this return the questions in dispute were argued
at length by counsel. On the next day without reaching any final
judgment on the matters submitted in argument the day before,
the court passed the following order : "It is ordered in the above
entitled cause, that the board of state canvassers, consisting of
H. E. Hayne, secretary of state, as chairman, and F. L. Cardozo
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treasurer, T. C. Dunn, conaptroller-general, William Stone,
attorney-general, and 11. W. Purvis, adutant and inspectorgeneral, do forthwith proceed to aggregate the statements forwardcd
to them by the board of county canvassers, and ascertain the
persons who have received the greatest number of votes for the
offices for which they were candidates respectively at the general
election held in the state on the 7th inst., and certify their action
in the premises under this order to the court.
" This order to apply to all officers voted for at said general
election, except the offices of governor and lieutenant-governor,
which are not in question by the pleadings." This order, it will
be seen, required a mere report from the face of the returns, but
not any final action.
November 21st the board filed with the court a report in which
they give in detail a statement of the votes cast in the several
counties as shown by the returns of the county canvassers, for
the offices of elector of president and vice-president, secretary of
state, attorney-general, state treasurer, controller-general, superintendent of education, members of Congress, members of the
General Assembly, senators atid county officers. According to
this report there would be elected to the General Assembly a majority of those who were candidates on the Hampton ticket. In
making their report the board refer to protests regarding the election in Edgefield, Barnwell and Lawrence counties, and evidences
.and allegations of fraud and of protests and notices of contests from
other counties, and say that in view of these they cannot properly
ascertain and certify who have actually received the greater number of legal votes in such counties for the several offices voted for
unless they have the opportunity of investigating the allegations
and hearing evidence on the protests.
On filing this report the following rule was entered: "It appearing from an inspection of the above stated petition for mandamus that the same relates to different classes of officers, to wit, of
members of the General Assembly, of electors for president and
vice-president of the United States, of members of Congress of the
United States, of circuit solicitors, of county officers, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the court that there are, or may be
shown to be, different provisions or rules of law applicable to these
several classes of officers, and that the emergency of time may render necessary and proper a priority in the order in which the court
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shall pass upon the questions of law relating and applicable to these
different classes of officers respectively :1 Ordered, that the petition herein be considered and determined
by the court, as if several separate petitions had been filed herein,
one each in the several above specified different classes of officers.
November 21st 1876."
At the date of this action the time for the meeting of the General
Assembly was only seven days distant, and the result of the election for members was not yet ascertained and declared. The
necessity for immediate action was consequently very great, and
this was pressed upon the attention of the court. The court,
therefore, ordered the case made by the petition, so far as related
to the members of the General Assembly, to be at once taken up,
and it was proceeded with and discussed. At the opening of the
court on the next morning the following opinion was announced
by the chief justice:"The necessity of an immediate decision prevents, for the present, any extended views of the court on the question submitted
for its determination, neither does it propose now to declare its
views of the extent or the character of the powers of the board of
state canvassers, except so far as they relate to the election of
members of the General Assembly.
"The Constitution, by the 14th section of the second article,
declares that each house shall judge of the election, return, and
qualification of its own members.
It was necessary, therefore,
for the organization of each house, that a mode should be provided,
through which the choice of the electors might be made known,
so far as it primarily appeared from the evidence, which the statutes required should be submitted to them. Without some such
mode of ascertaining in the first instance the probable will of the
constituencies, there could be no organization of either house. It
is not intended by the authority conferred on the state board to
delegate to it any of the power vested by the Constitution in each
house, but merely to provide a mode and manner which was
deemed the most reliable and effective in ascertaining in each
county the will of the people expressed through the ballot box as
to the offices to be filled by the election. The machinery by which
the proposed end was to be met, was through the appointment of
precinct managers, boards of county canvassers and the board of
state canvassers. The several 'statements' submitted to the last
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named board, as required by the act, provided tie means not of
'judging of the election, return and qualifications of the members
of either house ;' but of ascertaining who, according to the mode
by which the fa'ct was to be established were entitled to the certificates ; not to show the election in the terms of the Constitution,
but the apparent choice of the people as expressed in the 'state-%
ments;' and this conclusion was to be reached by the evidence of
the number of votes east, and of the parties in whose favor the
greatest number of votes were given, for the senate or house, as the
case might be. It was not competent for the board to. determine,
as the house only could, who, in fact, was the chosen member; for
the extent of their means to that end were not commensurate with
that of the house. One averring against the seat of another, who
is admitted by the possession of the certificate, does not assert his
right by way of appeal from the action of the board, but asks the
intervention of the house by force of its inherent and original
jurisdiction. The board of state canvassers having certified to
this court the number of votes given in the various counties for
members of the General Assembly, now, in accordance with the
views above expressed" It is ordered, that a writ of peremptory mandamus do issue,
directed to the chairman and members of the board of state canvassers and the secretary of state, commanding the said board
forthwith to declare duly elected to the offices of senators and members of the House of Representatives, the persons who by said certificate of the said board to this court have received the greatest
number of votes therefor, and do forthwith deliver a certified statement and declaration thereof to the secretary of state; and commanding the secretary of state to make the proper record thereof
in his office, and without delay transmit a copy thereof, under seal
of his office, to each person thereby declared to be elected, and a
like copy to the governor, and cause a copy thereof to be printed
in one or more public newspapers of this state."
This opinion was announced and the order made in open court
in the presence of counsel for both parties. A recess having been
taken for dinner, the counsel for the, relators on tie re-assembling
of the court, moved to proceed upon a separate suggestion regarding
the case of electors of president and vice president; the counsel
for the respondents requested further time, and it was granted by
the court. At this very time, however, as it subsequently appeared,
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the board had adjourned sine die; having first held a meeting
without the knowledge of the relators, at which they declared
Rlayne and his associates oil the ticket and a majority of the candidates for the Assembly oil the same ticket duly'elected. They
had also at the same neeting determined that the candidates for
electors on their ticket were chosen, and announced the result on
members of Congress. In reaching their conclusions they had made
free use of judicial powers, and had rejected certain returns. November 23d Ilayne made return to the writ of mandamus, the substance of which is embraced in the following: "That having fully
completed their labors and performed their duties in the premises, a
motion was, on Wednesday, the 22d instant, regularly made and carried that the said board adjourn sine die, and thereupon the said
board accordingly adjourned at the hour of 12.48 1. m. of said day;
and at the time of the order of said court in this case, and of the
service thereof on this defendant, the board had ceased to exist.
ie therefore respectfully submits that 11o further proceedings or
action can be taken by him as a member of said board, and that
in view of its dissolution, a peremptory mandamus would be unavailing and cannot properly be allowed."
On the next (lay (Nov. 24th) the relators filed a statement setting forth the facts, and submitted it to the determination of the
court. Thereupon a rule was entered that the members of the
board show cause at 4 o'clock P. m. of that day why each should
not be attached "for contempt of this court, as shown by the record
of the proceedings of the board of state canvassers, taken on the
22d day of November 1876, after the judgment of this court had
been filed, and by his failure to obey the mandate of this court."
This having been served and a hearing had, orders were entered
of which we give the one in the case of Rayne. "The relators in
the above cause having filed their suggestion in this court on the
14th day of November 1876, praying, among other things, that the
said respondents might be commanded by this court to perform
their duties as state canvassers according to law ; and the said respondents having answered thereto and the duties and powers of
the board of state canvassers having been submitted to this court
and argument heard thereon; and the said respondents having
adopted their resolution, that this board will not act upon any proposition until the question of its powers and duties be decided by
the Supreme Court ; which said resolution was duly filed as an ex-
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hibit in this cause ; and the said board of state canvassers having,
in obedience to an order of this court, made their certified report to
this court, setting forth the persons who had received the highest
number of votes for the offices for which they were respectively
candidates at the general election hell in this state ol the 7th instant, and this court having, on the 22d day of November 1876,
made its order that a writ of mandamus do issue, directed to the
said respondents, commanding the said board of state canvassers
f(.rthwith to declare duly elected to the offices of senator and members of the House of Representatives the persons who, by the certificate of the said board of state canvassers to the said court had
received the greatest number of votes therefor, and forthwith to
deliver a certified statement and declaration thereof to the secretary of state, and commanding the secretary of state to make the
proper record thereof in his office, and without delay transmit a
copy thereof under the seal of his office to each person thereby declared to be elected, and a like copy to the governor, and cause a
copy thereof to be printed in one or more public newspapers of this
state ;
"And the said board of state canvassers having on the 22d of
November, and while this court was in session, met and made their
other certified statement of the persons who had received the greatest number of votes for members of the Senate, and members of the
House of Representatives, from the several counties, and declared
the same duly elected, and delivered said certified statement and
declaration to the secretary of state ; but the said board of state
canvassers refused to certify and declare as elected the personswho had received the greatest number of votes for members of the
Senate, and members of the House from the counties of Edgefield
and Laurens, and adjourned sine die;
"And this court, in pursuance of its order, dated the 22d day
of November, having issued its writ of mandamus, directed to the
said respondents, commanding them to do and perform the matters
and things hereinbefore set forth in their said order and to make
known to said court, forthwith, how they, the said respondents,
executed said writ ;
"And said writ, having been duly served upon the said respondente, and the said respondents having failed to obey the mandate
of this court expressed in said writ, and having failed to make any
return to said writ, showing their performance and execution of
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the mandate of this court, or good and sufficient cause why the
samc had not been done; and thereupon a rule having issued
from this court, on thc 24th day of November. directing the said
respondents to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt in not obeying said mandate of the court; and said rule
having been served on the said respondents, and the said respondents having appeared in court in answer to said rule, and having
failed to make any return thereto, or to show any good and sufficient reason why they had not obeyed and executed the mandate
of this court;
- It is now adjudged, That the said H. E. Ilayne is in contempt
of this court, and it is ordered, that he do pay a fine of $1500, and
that the sheriff of Richland county do take him, the said II. E.
IHayne into custody, and confine him in the common jail of said
county until he be discharged by order of this court."
This order was duly enforced by the arrest and imprisonment
of the parties condemned thereby.
It has been necessary to state these proceedings with particularity in order that we may understand and appreciate the legal bearings of the proceedings before Judge BOND, of the United States Circuit Court, which begin at this point. Calling attention to the fact
that .the mandamus had required of the members of the board
nothing beyond the declaring elected the candidates for seats in
the General Assembly having an apparent majority, and the certifying and recording of the result, and that the action of the board
in declaring tme result so far as concerned electors of president and
vice-president and members of Congress, was in no way called in
question either by the mandamus or the order to punish the members for contempt, we pass to the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus which was now presented to Judge BOND, on behalf of the
parties so adjudged in contempt.
It is not important to give this petition in full. In order to
give color of jurisdiction to the federal judge, it was, of course,
necessary to set out a case constituting prinidfacie an invasion by
the state court of the federal jurisdiction. By way of doing this
the petitioners proceed to show that they are canvassers not only
of the votes for state and county officers and members of the
General Assembly, but also for members of Congress and electors
of president and vice-president; and they assert" that in canvassing
the returns of said election for members of Congress and for electors
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of presidelit and vice-president, and determining and declaring
and certifying the result thereof, your petitioners were compelled
to canvass and declare the election for all the state and other
officers voted for at said election, except the governor andi lieutenantgovernor, not only by reason of their duties as defined by the laws
of said state, in respect to such state officers, but also by reason
of the fact that the returns of all the persons voted for, and all
other papers and evidences pertaining to said election, and within
the custody and jurisdiction of the board of state canvassers covered
and embraced the entire election, and was therefore necessarily
blended and commingled as one general whole." This is the pith
of the whole petition, and the basis of the conclusion which the
petitioners draw that "they are in custody and coifinement and
restrained of their liberty for acts (lone in pursuance of the laws
of the United States, and that they are in custody in violation of
the Constitution of the United States."
If this petition had not been sustained as sufficient, by a judge
presumably learned and logical, we should have supposed it safe
to assert that the case it made was not even plausible. What it
necessarily undertook to make out was that the relators were being
punished for something done by them in pursuance of the laws of
the United States. What they were being actually punished for,
as the petition showed, was for disobedience to the mandate of the
court regarding the canvassing and certifying the election of members to the state legislature. With this the laws of the United
States confessedly had nothing to do. But to give color for interference the petitioners say that the returns for members of the
General Assembly are necessarily "blended and commingled" with
those for electors and members of Congress; wherefore they suggest
the inference that they could not be separately canvassed. The
suggestion has no plausibility. As well might a judge when commanded by an appellate tribunal to enter an order in a certain case
object that the case was "blended and commingled" with others
on his docket, and lie must deal with his docket as "one general
whole." As well might a board of supervisors make a like returb
when required by mandamus to allow and provide for a certain one
out of a batch of accounts. When the returns of election in respect
to several offices are made on one sheet by the local managers, the
canvass by the state board as to each office, so far as concerns the
ministerial action in aggregating the votes and declaring the result
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is always in fact and in law a separate act.

If for convenience

in reaching the result, the votes as to all are brought into one
table, it is still true that the canvass as to each office is separate.
Indeed it could not possibly be otherwise. And it must be borne
in mind constantly that it was this ministerial act that the court

had required ; nothing more.
But the board claimed by their petition that it was their duty
to do something more than this; to go behind the returns and
decide upon the validity of elections in particular districts ; and
that in doing so as to members of the General Assembly they necessarily did so as to electors and members of Congress. Assuming
that their view of their duty in that regard was correct, it is sufficient to say t'hat the court thought otherwise, and that in obeying
its order to canvass and declare the result on members of the legislature theywould not in any manner have passed upon the validity or
invalidity of any election. Notwithstanding that action they would
still have been at liberty to exercise any "judicial powers" they possessed as regards the offices of electors and members of Congress.The claim of judicial powers as to those offices was therefore wholly
irrelevant. But let it be admitted that the board were correct in
claiming those powers as to all the offices voted for, and that the
members were being punished for illegally exercising them in
respect to members of the General Assembly ; it is still true that
this would not legally concern the federal court, and could not
constitute an invasion of federal jurisdiction. Admit that what
would make void the state election would make void the election
for representatives in Congress and electors, still it only comes to
this, that in each case the same question is involved, and arises
on the same state oF facts. But this often happens in legal proceedings, without any inseparable "blending and intermingling"
of the cases, and curiously enough arose before this very board,
and was dealt with by the members apparently without any embarrassment. It has already been stated that Hayne, Cardozo and
Dunn, constituting a majority of the board, were candidates for
re-election and their cases were to be passed upon. Now it is a
fundamental principle that a man shall not be judge in his own
cause; how then are thrir cases to be passed upon? Why, by the
simple expedient agreed hpoh by formal vote. of Mr. Ilayne standing aside while his case was passed upon ; Mr. Cardozo doing the
same in his case, and Mr. Dunn in his; thus each, though the
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returns as to all were necessarily " blended and commingled" having his case passed upon separately, without embarrassment, and
much to his satisfaction; though by voting on the case of his
associates and rejecting returns to elect them, he necessarily
passed upon the question which must rule his own case. How
transparent then the pretence that cases of different offices could
not be considered separately.
The federal judge, however, assumed that the petition showed
a primdfacie case for his interference, and thereupon ordered a
writ of habeas corpus to issue, returnable immediately. Had the
subsequent proceedings been different this order might have been
attributed to a conscientious desire to have any possible question
affecting the liberty of the citizen carefully presented and argued,
and might have been excused on the ground that, though the petition when closely examined manifestly made out no case, it was
sufficiently plausible at first blush to justify a judge in giving
counsel an opportunity to speak in its support. But the subsequent proceedings we venture to say were among the most extraordinary that ever took place before any judge of respectable position in this country; and though in the midst of the great political
excitemen.t that has since existed, they have been passed by with
little notice, we should be recreant to duty if we failed to call such
attention to them as shall enable the lover of liberty and the believer in law to comprehend their real nature and tendency.
The writ of habeas corpus was issued November 27th. It will be
remembered that the relators were in confinement for the refusal to
perform the ministerial duty of canvassing, declaring and certifying
the result of the election for members of the General Assembly according to the returns made to them. The time appointed for the
meeting of the General Assembly was the next day, the 28th. Confinement in all such cases has for its chief object to compel obedience
to the order of the court; and whatever might be the conclusion of
the federal judge on the application of the relators for a release, this
object would be wholly defeated unless the case were immediately
considered and disposed of. To postpone a bearing and decision
would effectually defeat the chief purpose of the proceedings in the
state court, even though it should subsequently be decided that
the federal court had no jurisdiction, or that the state court was
correct in the view taken of the duties of the canvassers. Yet this
was exactly what was done by the federal judge. When the rela-
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tors were brought up, although they were in confinement under a
sentence presumptively valid and lawful, and entitled to respect as
such, they were at once put in the nominal custody of the United
States marshal, but allowed to go at large as though the sentence
were presumptively illegal and void. We shall not question the
power of a judge to take bail pending a hearing before him, but
when the proceeding attacks the jurisdiction of a court of co-ordinate authority in passing final judgment, it is, to say the very
least, a case in which ordinary courtesy as between the tribunals
would require that the sentence be interfered with with hesitation,
and not at all if its purpose, in case of a remand, would in any
manner be embarrassed or prejudiced. But the course taken here
rendered it impossible for the state court under any circumstances
to enforce obedience to its order. Without deciding anything the
federal judge had given to his action the effect of a decision which
paralyzed the authority of the state court. The members of the
board of canvassers were thereby left at liberty to set the court at
defiance, and to persevere in their course regarding the canvass
which the Supreme Court of the state had declared illegal. The
result we all know; for the next few days a petty military officer,
without the pretence of civil authority, was the most important personage in South Carolina politics, and the laws were silent while
he with a squad of men selected a legislature. We all know that
for several days it seemed highly probable that dangerous commotions and possibly civil war might result from this high-handed act,
and that the state was saved from it only by the extraordinary
efforts of a few persons who fortunately were possessed of great
influence with the people and great power over excited assemblages.
Of all these proceedings, which excited the whole country, and
on which depended the rights of all the people of the state, and
possibly the peace of the nation, the judge of the United States
Circuit Court must be supposed to have been a calm spectator,
occupied diligently in determining whether he had or had not
jurisdiction to do what he had already done. The substantial
purpose of the writ had been accomplished when the relators were set
at liberty. The fines imposed upon them were insignificant when
compared with the real matter in controversy, which concerned
nothing less than the government of the state. The Supreme
Court of the state had made its decision, and the issuance of the
writ and the delay which followed had accomplished the purpose
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of defeating their action, so far as related to the public questions
covered by their decision, as effectually as if it had been set aside
by some superior authority. To consider the question further
with a view to determine whether the parties convicted of contempt
should be punished, was to quarrel over non-essentials after the
substance of the controversy had been appropriated. It may
fairly be assumed that afterwards when the federal judge with apparent seriousness proceeded to consider the question of his jurisdiction, he contemplated with grim humor the case of the Delaware judge who, when a prisoner was sentenced to the whipping
post, took care that the sentence should be carried into effect while
the motion for a new trial was being argued. We cannot believe
that this precedent was absent from the mind of the judge when
he relieved the relators from confinement pending his consideration of the question of his right to consider the case at all, and
at a time when his doing so would accomplish all the substantial
purposes of an adjudication.
Nevertheless it was proper and decorous that a formal adjudication should be had, and this took place December 10th. It is
impossible to refer the delay which had occurred to the difficulty
of the question, or to laborious researches on the part of the judge
in order to arrive at correct conclusions. The point of jurisdiction
was very simple, and whether decided one way or the other, the
deduction must be one of common sense rather than the result of
profound reasoning. Nor does the decision bear on its face evidence of investigation. The judge takes the unusual course of
appending to his opinion a note of authorities which he says he'
has " had occasion to refer to" in its preparation, but more than
half of them are to points which nobody disputes, and in what
manner the others support his deductions we are not informed.
In disposing of the application of the relators two questions
might require to be passed upon: whether the federal court had
jurisdiction to interfere in their behalf, and whether if it had, the
proceedings of the state court were so far defective or unwarranted
as to justify the discharge of the relators. The federal judge, after
a few preliminary remarks, proceeds with his opinion by saying
that " the first question to be decided at this time and upon this
motion is, whether or not the Supreme Court of South Carolina
had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it." Now
this seems a most extraordinary assertion. To the legal mind
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nothing could be more preposterous. The question thus stated the
judge could not decide at all unless he had jurisdiction to consider
it ; and what lie should say concerning it would constitute a mere
waste of words which nobody need heed and nobody would respect
if, when the question of his jurisdiction came to be decided, it
should turn out that he had no authority to pass upon it.
Obviously and necessarily the first question to be decided was whether
this judge himself had any jurisdiction to call in question the
action of the state court : "and to proceed to consider that action
and condemn it, and then gravely go on to decide whether he had
any authority to consider it, is such a reversal of the logical and
proper course of proceeding that we are compelled to look further
for a reason for considering first that which logically comes last
if it comes at all.
And we think a reason is made apparent by the opinion of the
judge. Ile had to deal with a case where the state court was proceeding to punish state canvassers for refusing to canvass the votes
for state officers in the manner directed by the court. With such a
proceeding obviously he had no concern.
Considered by itself it
was impossible to assert with any degree of plausibility that any
question concerning federal jurisdiction was involved. The state
court had by their writ of mandamus commanded their state officers
to aggregate certain votes for certain other state officers and to
declare and certify the result, and they had refused. This was
all ; and it was plainly a matter of merely state concern.
But by reversing the regular and logical course of proceeding a
way was found of bringing into the case certain sophistical reasoning which might seem to give plausible support to the jurisdiction
of the federal judge. How lame and halting is that reasoiing
will appear from the following extract fiom the opinion, which
embodies the whole argument. "An examination of the laws of
South Carolina will show that state and county officers are elected
on the same day that electors of president and vice-president and
representatives to Congress are voted for, and that they are voted
for on the same general ticket, and that all ballots at the several
precincts in each county are deposited in the same box, and are
counted and returned by the same set of election officers, and the
result of such election is certified to the board of state canvassers
by the officers holding the election.
"And section 5514, title LXX., Revised Statutes of United
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States, provides 'that any one who is proved to have voted at such
Dgeneral election shall bc deemed to have votd for representatives
in Congress.'
"The board of state canvassers is required to meet on the 10th
day of November for the purpose of sifting, scrutinizing, not merely
aggregating, the statements of the county boards. The validity
of the entire election in a certain precinct or county depends upon
a state of facts applicable to every officer, state or federal, who
has been voted for on the general ticket at that particular precinct. So far as the laws of the United States are concerned, at
an election where members of Congress are to be chosen, any
alleged intimidation or violence toward the voter, or any other
misdemeanor described in section 5511 of the Revised Statutes,
would be a proper consideration for the board in determining the
result; because such violations of the laws of the United States,
if sufficient in degree in the judgment of the board of state canvassers would control the result.
"This is the law of South Carolina as applied concurrently with
the paramount law of the land-the Acts of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States.
"The board of state canvassers was not at liberty in canvassing
the votes to shut its eyes to the laws of Congress respecting what
was a fraudulent poll. In the petition the board alleges it was
necessary, in canvassing the returns for federal officers at this
*general election, where both state and federal officers were voted
for on the same ticket, to canvass all the votes polled and to declare
the election of state officers after such canvass as well as federal
officers, and it is manifest that to determine a general election, the
amount of fraud and intimidation, if there was any exercised, to
control the vote for state officers, must have had some influence
upon the election of federal officers, and what the effect of it was
upon such election it was for the board to determine."
The argument stated briefly is this : The canvassers were can.
vassers of the election of both state and federal offices. They were
vested with discretionary and judicial powers. They therefore
were not compelled merely to aggregate and report results shown
by the returns, but might reject returns altogether. If they did
so, their action would affect not state officers merely, but federal
officers. Therefore the federal court had a right to interfere and
protect them. Now the answer to all this has already been given.
VOL. XXV.-19
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The state court had not required the canvassers to exercise this
judicial authority as regards the election of members of Congress
and electors, nor forbidden its exercise.

interfered with it.

It had not in any manner

Consistent with the mandamus issued by that

court the board of state canvassers might proceed to 'reject returns
so far as they bore upon the election of those officers, or they might
refuse to do. The state court, in issuing its mandamus and in
proceeding to punish for contempt had very carefully held aloof
from any question involving the federal jurisdiction. When therefore the judge asserts that the board might lawfully do certain
things which would affect the election of members of Congress and
electors, and therefore the state court could not interfere with their
action, and proceeds thence to the therefore that he might discharge
these recusant officers, it is plain that he begins with a fallacy in
order that he may deduce from it an unsound conclusion. What
the board mniqht have done which it would be unlawful to punish
the members for, was of no moment. The judge himself correctly
stated the question to be whether the relators were in custody for
an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States,
or in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States ;
and no sophistry could conceal or mystify the fact that they were
in custody for nothing but disobedience to a command of the state
court relating exclusively to a matter of state law. If we accept
the view expressed by the judge we may as well say, as in effect he
does, that the board even in passing upon the election of state and
county officers were acting under and were controlled and protected

by the laws of Congress. This effectually removes them from state
jurisdiction, and makes them for all practical purposes federal
officers. Moreover the like logic would make every officer in the
state a federal officer; for there is not an official act done by one
of them that may not in some way, directly or remotely, affect a
federal office, power or jurisdiction. This is inevitable under the
system of government we have subscribed to and live under; the
complicated nature of our government precludes its being otherwise. We thus reach, by a single dash of the judicial pen, a consolidated government.
But let it be admitted that in passing upon the election of
members of the General Assembly the board necessarily passed upon
the same questions which would be involved when the election for
members of Congress came to be canvassed: what pretence of
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authority does this give for interference so long as only the election for members of the General Assembly is being controlled ?
May John Doe interfere and enjoin the proceedings in a suit against
Richard Roe because the same questions arise and must be passed
upon in it which will arise in his own case standing next on the
docket? Will not the court say to him that it will be time enough
to consider the questions as they effect him when his own ease is
called for trial ? On the judge's own reasoning what possible
ground could there be for interference until the case of those
officers was to be considered which he claimed must be passed upon
under the laws of Congress? We repeat; the board had made the
canvass as to those officers, and it had passed unchallenged by any
order or decision of thb state court. The court had ruled that the
functions of the board were only ministerial, and though the board
had held otherwise and proceeded to exercise that extraordinary
species of ezparte arbitrary authority which has lately been dignified with the appellation "judicial," yet the court had not claimed
or assumed a right to interfere afterwards except so far as concerned the election for members of the General Assembly. The
validity or invalidity of any election for members of Congress, or
for electors of president and vice-president would have been not in
any manner disturbed or passed upon by the board in yielding
obedience to the order of the court.
The federal judge discharged the relators, with expressions of
"regretat being compelled to differ with his "brethren of the state
court" and with a declaration of his happiness '"to think that this
controversy may be referred to a -tribunal whose judgment we all
respect, the Supreme Court of the United States, and I shall be
as little displeased as any one to hear that in this judgment I have
been in error." That is to say, if at some future time, say two
years or more hence, when the case can be reached in the Supreme
Court, long after the parties who invited this usurpation of state
authority have accomplished the purpose for which they sought it,
the abstract question of whether he was right or wrong shall be
decided against him, he will not regret it. No one could know
better than this judge that the wrong done by his decision could
not in any such way effectually be righted. If he were by his writ
of habeas corpus to bring up all the convicts restrained of their
liberty in the state penitentiary and by his order set them at liberty on the ground that some person therein was confined in viola-

